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The mind, as the centre of reflection and decision making
in every individual, is decisive in the formation of the
collective will we associate with legitimate democratic
governance and socially transformative action in modern
societies. A democratic society is one in which, ideally,
citizens collectively govern themselves. They give the
laws to themselves and control their own history, which,
among other things, requires conU11Unication, deliberation,
the achievement of some consensus, and effective action.
Democratic fi-eedom, or political autonomy, exists when
the laws that bind citizens are the product of their will
in accordance with insights they have acquired inter-
subjectively. Such intersubjective communication, however,
ought to refer not just to discursive discussion, which is
what it means in most of the deliberative democracy
literature, but also to aesthetic communication, which
can take a great many forms that influence and entwine
with deliberation. The theory of democracy ideally
clarifies the conditions under which democratic freedom
is obtained. Hence, a full understanding of cognition will
aid the theory of democracy by clarifYing the ways people
comprehend, come to understanding with one another,
and embody the relationship between knowledge and
social action.
It is my contention that the mind must be understood
not as an individual phenomenon, but as a social one
that relies on communicative interactions of significant
complexity along multiple axes of mind and body, body
and environment, and the intersubjective relations of
mind and other minds that are the products of society
and politics. It is precisely because the processes of the
mind occur in communicative (or cultural and political)
contexts and are not simply products of physiological
processes in the brain or nervous system that the study of
cognition is necessarily the study of social cognition (or
socio-political cognition). I want to argue that, as a result,
an aesthetics of democracy is required for confluence
with deliberation in the public sphere. This article poses
a set of questions that I consider important for such an
aesthetics of democracy, but which demand further
research. Nevertheless, in what follows, I suggest some
tentative responses. Specifically, along with ]ameson,l I
wish to affirm the distinctiveness of postmodern consumer
culture, but also the dialectic still required by contemporary
cultural politics. I begin with a reflection on the ideas of
communicative freedom and communicative power by
way of a critique of the cognitive theory of mass art.
Next, I consider the idea of social cognition in recent
cognitive science. I would like to indicate how
Marxiological critical theory is consistent with recent
social cognition research and how changes in postmodern
media culture demonstrate this affinity. I conclude with
a consideration of the confluence ofpolitics and cognition
via a contemporary example that demonstrates the
dialectic ofan aesthetics of democracy in music technology
in the public sphere.
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Communicative freedom and communicative power
Communicative freedom may be taken as a key concept in
cultural political theory because it mediates the relation
between the social complex of aesthetic production-
consumption and the public sphere of political commu-
nication. Communicative freedom, I contend, ought to
denote a broad set of concerns, from the production of
cultural artefacts to the constitution of political goods
and goals that involves a relationship to the social totality.
As such, communicative freedom indicates more than
freedom of speech and opinion, which is emphasized in
the liberal tradition, although such freedom would be
included in any adequate concept of communicative
freedom. A safe, communicative context, free from coer-
cion, intimidation, and ideological distortion, corresponds
to the former freedom, as does the empowerment of
capacities for participating effectively in democratic
opinion and will formation. Communicative empower-
ment is indicated by the need to develop a certain level
of communicative competence, for example, or having
access to available opinions on matters of importance
relevant to one's interests. Such intellectual fi'eedom
fi'om constraint and material intellectual empowerment
to be capable of such freedoms are among the central
normative requirements for the possibility of individual
and social development, as authors since Immanuel Kant
and John Stuart Mill have argued. The social-democratic
side of the liberal tradition continues to emphasize access
to adequate resources for the constitution of meaningful
freedom and equality in democratic societies, which,
when absent or unavailable, entail unjustified inequality and
exclusion.2 The liberal political economy of COlTUllunica-
tion indicates a similar relationship of necessity between
meaningful access to adequate communicative resources
for the constitution of democratic citizens in mass
democracies, since one must have the opportunity to
recognize (and formulate) as well as to respond to one's
social interests if political power is to be described as
democratic. Such freedom is, as James Bohman argues,
inherent to the idea of deliberative democracy.3 When
such access is selective, suppressed or absent, we may
speak of "distorted" or ideological communication, due
to the contradiction between the assumption of free
conullunication and its denial through the effects of
unofficial power.
My concern here, however, is to draw attention to
the level of constitution that liberal and deliberative
democratic thought tends to neglect, namely, the aesthetic
constitution of the democratic citizen that precedes and
commingles with the citizen's mind in the process of
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cognitive achievement. Political theory cannot neglect
the importance of this category of constitution, as it
bears upon the core concept of fi'eedom in the liberal and
deliberative democratic traditions. Aesthetic constitution
has been understood as an "aesthetic state," the quest for
which has been a major philosophical theme from
ancient Greece through modern (especially German)
traditions of thought. 4 Aesthetic fi-eedom, for Plato, was
fi'eedom of the individual from the domination of the
soul-damaging passions, the corruption of the mind that
the body is wont to impose. Plato's aesthetic freedom
required significant discipline (from the self and the state)
and ethical commitment to the fraternal community of
the polis. But the cultural expression of passion is no
longer susceptible to such ethical criticism. Besides the
fact that Plato's version relies on untenable metaphysical
justifications, aesthetic consumption, just as much as
production, can constitute communicative freedom and
therefore passion cannot be abstracted from ethical
performance for the purposes of moral criticism.5 The
Aristotelian tradition is perhaps more useful than the
Platonic regarding aesthetic development and passion,
since it continues to pay close attention to the cognitive
moment ofaesthetic experience in the context of (political)
justice and the uses of rhetoric.6 But the nea-Aristotelian
position that rhetoric therefore can be used for good or
ill betrays its limits: the Aristotelian must deny that
communication technology itself is capable ofproducing
values independently of what human beings may intend
with its use.
Hence, for my purposes, communicative power does
not refer to the power of rhetoric or oratory. Such power
is communicative in a different sense. The trace of
communicative power may be found in rhetoric, but its
motivation is not the persuasive force or sheer enjoyment
of beautiful speech. The Western philosophical tradition
has been justly interested in rhetoric, and the influence
of this interest in the history of philosophy and in other
humanities and social science disciplines is well recognized.
Plato's critique of oratory-perhaps summed up in his
analogy, "what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to
legislation, and what pastry baking is to medicine, oratory
is to justice"7-conceives the danger of rhetorical power
in terms of its corrupting or decadent influence. That is,
like Plato's concern with all art, it is the effects of such
power that is important. The Aristotelian tradition is far
more willing to draw attention to the positive political
effects of good rhetoric, but the epistemic interest
remains focused on the relation of its cause and effect.
When I speak of communicative power, I speak of a
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social force at the level of communicative constitution. It
is not a rhetorical effect at the level ofsemantic achievement
or that of ethical practice.
In this context it is useful to examine a recent debate
over the role of cognitive theory in cultural studies.
David Bordwell's work on the poetics of film seeks to
understand the principles by which films are designed to
achieve certain effects on audiences, and is explicitly
conceived as a social-psychological alternative to
hermeneutic and critical sociological analyses of film that
arise from semiotics and poststructuralism (and, by
implication, my own approach). 8 Similarly, from a
philosophical perspective that draws on Aristotle and
"ordinary language" philosophy, Noel Carro1l9 foregrounds
a cognitive approach to film study in which an innate
"recognition" rather than learned convention (linguistic
or cultural code-based10) is decisive in pictorial com-
prehension. Without fully engaging with Carroll's
interpretations and extensive criticism of contemporary
film theory and critical theory, I would like to note the
naturalistic and methodological aspects ofhis proposal for
a cognitive theory of mass art.
Carroll's position emerges from the Anglo-American
tradition of analytic philosophy, which has tended, until
recently, to ignore or dismiss mass art as a worthy
philosophical topic. Carroll seeks to redress this in a
series of studies of primarily moving film and television
images, culminating in "a philosophy of mass art" that
emphasizes the cognitive moment. Carroll considers
inquiry into mass art to be philosophical when it concerns
the nature of mass art. The nature of mass art, Carroll
contends, is determined by the fact that "it is designed to
serve mass society... it isJor mass consumption." Mass art is
something produced and distributed by a mass technology
and its structural features tend toward "those choices that
promise accessibility with minimum effort... for the largest
number ofuntutored (or relatively untutored) audiences."ll
The research question that emerges from this concerns
"what it is about the relevant works that enables them to
command the attention of large audiences." For Carroll,
devices of mass movie and TV narration (for example,
point-of-view editing) or rock and roll (the backbeat, the
"broad emotive contours" of its tones) can help explain
the nature of mass art and its intended function, which
is "to elicit mass engagement." Standardized plots, for-
mulaic structures, and repetition are not somehow
failings of mass art, but are in fact design features that
enable understanding. 12
Carroll's emphasis on cognition-the functional
requirement ofmass accessibility for mass art-is deepened
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in detailed discussions of mass art in connection with
emotions, morality, and ideology. For example, the function
of emotions for narrative fictions and mass art is "the
management of the audience's attention" via the
mobilization of certain pre-existing dispositions and
preferences so that the manipulation of emotions in mass
art provides "an affective cement" that fixes and shapes
our attention to the text. 13 For Carroll, criticisms that
mass art panders to superficial or shallow emotions or
relies on emotions that are "standardized" (Adorno) or
"canned" (R. G. Collingwood) are misguided, not only
because it is a functional requirement of mass art to use
easily-accessible emotional appeals, but also because
there exist "nearly universal emotions" as wel1 as a
corresponding human capacity to recognize them, shared
cross-cultural1y. This is how Carrol1 explains the inter-
national popularity of motion pictures and confirms
that such "universal" appeals are indeed a condition of
possibility for the employment of such central narrative
devices of visual conununication in mass art, for example,
point-of-view editing. 14
Carroll's functionalist approach to mass art is clear
regarding its limited applicability to evaluating mass
artworks: accessibility and comprehensibility to large
audiences cannot provide a standard by which to Judge
the value of mass artworks except insofar as an artwork
can be considered "good" if it succeeds in being accessible
and comprehensible to large audiences. But one may
nevertheless judge the appropriateness of, for example,
the emotional address of a mass artwork, by following
Aristotle. We may assess whether "the right emotion is
brought to bear on the right object with the right level
intensity for the right reason."15 A propaganda film that
encourages race hatred by eliciting disgust for an ethnic
group can be judged to be emotionally inappropriate.The
sentimental mass artwork presents a level of emotional
intensity that is out of proportion with its object. Such
assessments are to be done on a case-by-case basis and
cannot be applied to mass artworks on a whole. In such
a conception, everything hangs upon what is judged to
be "right" or "appropriate." However, Carroll says nothing
about the sociological conditions that stand behind
judgments of right and appropriateness. He does not
acknowledge that the activity of judgment is always a
communicative process that requires a set of intellectual
and material conditions in order to be possible. And this
set of intellectual and material conditions is not simply
given, but must be actively produced and reproduced
in the dynamic communicative interaction between
audience and artwork.
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As a result, neither Bordwell nor Carroll explain how
the motivation they identifY in audience guidance
mechanisms is generated or from what process comes the
"moral imagination" admitted to be present in audiences,
except insofar as they are mobilizations of existing
culturally-acquired knowledges and "innate" capacities
for recognition. To a large extent, this limit is imposed by
the positivist methodology that both authors rely upon.
Carroll seems to presume that the nature of mass art is
something essential, as if it could be determined by the
"facts" that he assembles and to which he refers. This
tends to be a characteristic of all functionalist approaches.
Competing theories,for example, fail to "fit" or"correspond
to" the "facts" of mass art. 16 This begs the question of
just how these facts are determined and isolated such
that they can function as a determining moment in the
system and in his argument. The facts of observable
phenomena and the identification ofinnate capacities are
generated through a communicative process that involves
the philosopher. Carroll fails to include any account of
such a hermeneutic self-reflexive theory, which would
require, among other things, an adequate sociology of
knowledge. Critical theory, along with other social
theories such as hermeneutics and systems theory
(although with different conceptions), provide self-
reflective accounts of the communicative generation of
their own theories, and thus are epistemologically
superior. 17 In order to provide an adequate account of
the moral imagination of audiences, one needs to involve
not just observations of existing dispositions, but the
communicative process through which moral imagination
is acquired, reproduced, and developed. My question-
how is the audience guided (at all)?-is thus at different
logical and methodological levels than BOl'dwell's and
Carroll's analyses of particular filmic conventions, styles,
grammars, or emotive man.ipulations. My contention is that
we can explain motivation at tllis level as a systematic-cre-
ative process of synthesizing perception, thought, and aes-
thetic orientation-conununicative power-that relies
on the structure and activity of interpretation as an aes-
thetic-cognitive achievement. Interpretive action, as I
understand it, always occurs as an aesthetic-cognitive
event, a dynamic communicative encounter between
audiences and artworks within a historical context.
Carroll neglects this historical communicative process,
gazing straight through it as though it were a glassy slide.
The concept of aesthetic that is to be used must be
modern to the degree that it accounts for the self-reflexive
context of production and cannot invoke or assume any
particular cultural form or political order as ground. Yet
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in sympathy with the ancient idea, it is crucial to continue
to regard the aesthetic to be of the body as well as of art.
For as political economy emphasizes, production and
consumption are but two sides of the same coin.What is
to be called the aesthetic is thus a complex system ofsocial,
intellectual, and somatic elements and their relationships
that remains open to continual development and com-
plexification (or de-complexification, depending on the
process).As such, it refers to a domain and a set of relations
rather than a state of being (which marks the decisive
difference with a Plato or an Aristotle). I am interested
especially in how we may understand the sensorium as a
body-mind that makes sense only within a socio-llistorical
context, a body-mind in constant dynamic relations with
its social environment. How does the aesthetic domain
correspond to and complete cognitive achievement?
Cognitive science and culture
The term "information society" registers the enormous
transfer ofcognition to computers---artificial intelligence--
that has occurred over the last decades. Yet there is no
natural programrning for human interaction with artificial
information processing systems, hence the need to
consciously evolve a new"cognitive map" in order to orient
people toward their new socio-cultural environment. 18
Critical theory has always maintained that there is a
close relationship between the processes of mind, bodily
experience, and cultural context, but, with a few
exceptions within poststructuralist critical theory, such
as William Connolly,19 Marxiological critical theory has
not yet availed itself of the contributions of recent
cognitive science. For this,Jameson's notion of cognitive
mapping20 is useful: in postmodernity, our minds are
presently incapable of mapping "the great global multi-
national and decentred communicational network in
which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects."21
Jameson calls for an aesthetic of cognitive mapping as a
response, "a pedagogical political culture which seeks to
endow the individual subject with some new heightened
sense of its place in the global system" so that "individual
and collective subjects may regain the capacity to act and
struggle."22 Cognitive mapping projects aesthetics and
politics under postmodern conditions; it seeks to represent
to the collectivity its real conditions of existence in the
interests of democratic empowerment. This, however, is
no easy task.
Despite the burgeoning research on social cognition,
there rem.aim a great deal of confusion and controversy
in philosophical and social scientific discussions about
the relationship between cognition and culture, as my
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discussion of Bordwell and Carroll indicated.
Behaviourist and positivist approaches are nevertheless
being challenged by data that indicate a mutually-
determining relationship between cognitive behaviour
and the organism's environment (its culture and natural
setting). The behaviourist assumes a hard-wired natural
condition for and a set of dispositions to the psychology
of the human subject, which can be revealed through
experimental observation-in neuroscience, Leslie
Brothers calls this "neuroism."23 However, recent cognitive
science and psychology reveals an "enactive," mutual
relationship between the mind and its embodied
experience of the world that belies the subjective
ground for knowledge that the behaviourist or neuroist
assumes.24 Moreover, Bruce E. Wexler argues that a
requirement for dynamic consistency between internal
cognitive structure, which can be shown to be a product
of historical social learning, and external cultural or
environmental structure can be observed in social
psychological studies. 25 Wexler, a psychiatrist reaching to
other disciplines, suggests that social pathologies such as
anomie and ethnic conflict can be (partially) explained
by the dissonance between internal brain structure and
external cultural structure within a historical context.
If we examine analytic philosophy of cognition and
culture once more, we find erroneous assumptions similar
to behaviourism. As I have discussed, Carroll employs a
cognitive approach to the study of mass art by using an
"ordinary language" methodology, heavily indebted to
positivism, that seeks to reveal the nature of mass art
through a "classificatory" approach (that is, he seeks to
classifY not to criticize mass art). Carroll achieves this by
maintaining a strict separation between the work ofmass
art and its audience such that it is the audience that
brings a "working folk psychology" to the text "as a
condition of narrative intelligibility"-the manufacturers
of mass art do not ilnpose ideological viewpoints on
their audiences, instead they stimulate pre-existing attitudes
and knowledges. Neither does mass art automatize and
stupefY the mental faculties of its audience, as he believes
Max Horkheimer and Adorno,26 among others argue,
for there are many mass artworks that can be said to
stimulate the imagination (for example, The X-Files or
the horror genre, which often leaves its monsters off-screen
in order to activate audience imagination).27 Through
the rhetorical strategy of the narrative enthymeme Oeaving
something out of the story in order to have the audience
fill in the missing premise), Carroll contends that "mass
artworks do not function as the source of new beliefs
about human conduct, but mobilize pre-existing ones
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[and] activate audience preconceptions."28 Hence, mass
artworks may reinforce ideology, but they are not a major
originating source. Indeed, for Carroll, mediation has
no mode of consciousness or political construction-
technologies, "in and of themselves, are morally neutral."29
Carroll's strict separation of human subject and cultural
object permits him to make this argument. Perception,
for Carroll, is not very plastic at all: "The human sensorium
is a biological mechanism."To suggest that culture affects
perception is to confuse literal perception with conceptual
perception: "what we literally see is a matter of biology,
not culture or history."30 But it is precisely this notion
that has been thrown into doubt by recent interdisciplinary
cognitive studies and, at another level, the history of
critical theory. Cognitive studies appears to confirm
rather than to contradict critical theory's view of cognition
and culture. A more detailed engagement with Carroll's
and Bordwell's work, which would require far more
space than is available here, will reveal the full extent of
the epistemological and political deficiencies of such
approaches that do not take the mutual determination of
cognition and culture seriously.
Assumptions such as Carroll's have nevertheless stood
behind "cognitivism" in cognitive disciplines for decades.
Cognitivism refers in general to the assumption that
information processing is symbolic computation-the
rule-based manipulation of symbols such that when the
symbols appropriately represent some aspect of the real
world, information processing can lead to a successful
solution of the problem given to the system.31 In this
approach, the digital computer is the dominant
metaphor for understanding symbolic processing of the
brain.The brain consists of multiple subsystems processing
and interacting below the level of consciousness, such
that cognition occurs without requiring the sense of
"self." Artificial intelligence (AI) could be produced
through correct programming and arrangement of
subsystem processing units that, once complex and fast
enough to match the dazzling parallel computing power
of the brain, would make possible the dreams of AI
researchers like Hans Moravec and Marvin Minsky, who
think that one day human beings can slough off the
"wet" embodiment of consciousness and potentially live
forever by placing their consciousnesses in "dry" sili-
cone-based machines. Mter decades of computer manip-
ulation of increasing complexity, such cognitive science
has utterly failed to reproduce anything remotely like
human consciousness in a machine (although literary,
cinematic, and televisual visions of such AI and cyborgs
proliferate). The reason for failure was, in large part, the
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faulty epistemology. Conceiving of cognitive processes as
representational processes reduces communication to
reified symbols and thereby makes it impossible to see
the immanent intersubjective and social dimensions of the
communication that forms minds. Symbolic representation
is constructed at a different logical level than that of
meaning. The former is governed by rules and their
application, the latter is the result of the interpretation of
the rules of application. Such interpretation involves
bringing forth the world in which the cognitive object
"makes sense," and this bringing forth of the world cannot
simply be an application of more rules. If it were simply
the application of more rules, it would entail an infinite
regress (logical incoherence), since the move in logical
level would never occur. But more importantly, making
sense in the world requires the concept and practice
of narrative. We cannot apply the rules of symbolic
representation without placing that application within
a narrative context. Above all else, this hermeneutic
insight undermines any notion of the brain or mind as
a computer, since it observes that the brain always functions
in relationship to a social domain in which the "self" that
makes sense is produced and that is external to the brain's
physiological rule-governed processes. Hence, rejecting





brings cognitive science toward social science. If artificial
human intelligence is possible at all-and Roger
Penrose, Hubert Dreyfus, and John Searle adamantly
contend that it is not32-it will not be by sophisticated
programming alone but by developing such consciousness
through social learning processes that must occur over
time and within bodily and social comexts,just as it is for
humans. This, it seems to me, is just what Deb Roy,
director of the Cognitive Machines Group at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is currently
attempting with his robots. Ripley, a robot "child," is
gradually being taught about the world through social
interaction with people, not through programming
knowledge. For example, Roy and his team have studied
pre-linguistic infants to see how mothers talk to their
babies about toy objects while the babies play with
them. The researchers adapt this behaviour for teaching
the robot. 33 Roy combines concepts from semiotics
and schema theory to develop a holistic approach to
linguistic meaning that seeks to connect language and
world for "meaning machines."34 Others are likewise
attempting to unblock AI research by developing models of
intelligence and reasoning that recognize the importance
of "conversation and narrative,"35 along with emotion
and feeling. 36
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The activity of the bringing forth of a contextual
world appears to be a quasi-transcendental feature of
human communication. Contextual world appearance
remains, like language itself, in a peculiar half-transcendence
to linguistic subjects-able to be observed but never
quite able to be captured completely as the object of a
linguistic utterance. For to identifY this activity as an
object, one has already brought forth the world in which
this activity makes sense. As such, it seems necessary to
understand the phenomenon ofbringing forth the world
in interpretive action as somehow "emergent" frOlu, but
not identical to, the structural elements, pathic content,
and textual n'leaning of the communicative artefacts of
comprehension. Emergence is a concept derived from
systems theory. It names the qualitative process through
which new features or behaviours arise in a dynamic
system that relate to the combination or interaction of
the elements of the system but cannot be causally
reduced to those elements. The pattern recognition of
the moire phenomenon, or the perception of the
morphology of a face, are examples of this. World
appearance is emergent because it must be actualized in
the process of communication and because the cognitive
"pattern" of comprehension emerges from but cannot be
reduced to the ideas, images, or symbols that comprise it.
There is a gap, a non-identical step or move in which the
power of comprehension manifests itself but which
cannot itself be observed or, it seems, be at all known to
theory in any conventional sense.
This emergent quality is profound in the philosophical
sense, but it is also decisive theoretically for understanding
human communication for a number of reasons.
Emergence, like the non-identical, cannot properly be an
object of speech or communication, for that would make
it merely a symbol, a coded element of a semantic for-
mulation that is exhausted at the semiotic level. Neither
is it quite a structural component of communication
such as grammar or, at a social level, political ordering-
for example, the political bias of discourses and practices
in Michel Foucault's sense. I suggest that it is perhaps best
understood as the constitutive non-identical communica-
tive power of comprehension, of human creativity itself,
within the symbolic universe, and must remain in this
peculiar half-transcendence.
Instead of finding a deconstructive limit in the
necessary "illusion" of all perception,37 one may employ
the media theory of cybernetics and its cognitive science,
along with critical theory's emphasis on the centrality of
interpretive power, in order to think the process of
perception from the inside. One does not thereby avoid
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or overcome the condition that perception (and therefore
theory) cannot exist without illusion, but illusion does
then lose its suspicious sense. Illusion is, in fact, a necessary
condition of the human nervous system (and, it stands to
reason, any nervous system) since the nervous system
only operates with information internal to its own
functions-that is, transforms, constructs, gestalts.
Sensory organs are stimulated or perturbed by outside
forces but the experience of such sensory data is always
mediated by the transmission process (a process that
remains, and I suspect will always remain, a mystery to
cognitive science). As a consequence, no information can
be transmitted directly from the outside.38 The whole
organism must always translate and construct its relationship
to its outside from the information that the closed nervous
system provides. Again, this contrasts radically with
computers or any known machine. A computer receives
instructions from a user that are inputted directly via
the user interface and it uses a machine language to
communicate internally between its components and
externally with other computers. There is no translation
in computer operations in the sense I am using this term,
because the computer is an integrated extension ofhuman
technical control and not simply an external entity.
This internal level of nervous system translation is
the first domain of cognitive experience, but it is only
one element in human cognition. Such translation can
become complete as a properly human cognitive
achievement only by joining or becoming part of the
imaginative domain of social interaction with others
capable of such imagination. The symbolic domain
always remains distinct from the materiality of the sign.39
We establish the sense of the self that begins to perceive
and coordinate its behaviour with the world and with
others only by internalizing structurally and pragmati-
cally independent communicative relations. But it is the
need to join in the imaginative domain of aesthetic
comprehension that fully completes human under-
standing (even if such completion is distorted by social
arrangements today).
Cognition and the political
To emphasize the notion of social cognition is not to set
aside or devalue the experiential processes of the body-
quite the contrary. Bodies are individual and their
experiences are unique. The body's singularity is never-
theless always already incorporated into the social, since
each perception makes sense only as the result of a history
of learning processes within the social contexts in which
the particular body-mind relation has developed. In this
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way, the body can be inscribed with social relations of
domination40 constituted by the biopower ofinstitutions
and discourses,41 and it can react, often violently as
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri point out, in the
biopolitics of resistance to the harms of globalization.42
It is precisely the complexity of this set of relations
between the sensate body and the social mind that needs
to be carefully elaborated and clarified. To reduce the
mind to a product of physiological processes (neuroist
cognitive science) or genetic determ.i.nations (the search
for the gene for crime, for example, which, according to
Ted Peters, is impossible43) is to reify the body-mind
relation. Conversely, to ignore the body and conceive of
the mind as a product of social and cultural processes-
the radical social constructivism ofsome poststructuralists,
for example, Jean Baudrillard,44 or equally in this respect
the emphasis of communitarians such as Alasdair
MacIntyre45 on practical virtues, tradition and ritual-is
to reify the relation from the opposite direction.
Cognition cannot be abstracted from the social, nor from
the experience and materiality of the body. David
McNally's recent work has drawn especially on Waiter
Benjamin's analysis of the bodily, erotic, and mimetic
dimensions of language to argue that communication
must always be seen as a matter oflife and labour, which,
under the alienated conditions of capitalist society, entails
that the analysis of communication involves liberation46
Also following Benjamin in a Marxiological frame-
work, Susan Buck-Morss observes that the shock of the
imposition of machine culture on the human body
under capitalism-the injury to everyone of the human
senses that the factory system entails-forces a dialectical
reversal to the human aesthetic system: "The human
sensorium changes from a mode of being 'in touch' with
reality to a means of blocking out reality. Aesthetics-
sensory perception-becomes anaesthetics, a numbing of
the senses' cognitive capacity that destroys the human
organism's power to respond politically even when self-
preservation is at stake."47 TIlls dialectic plays itself out at
many levels and in many contexts in postmodern society.
If cognitive science has begun to discover the cultural,
must it also recognize the political as a result of this
dialectic? My belief is that it must. It would be reasonable
to hypothesize that, if the new interdisciplinary cognitive
studies is correct and there is a much closer relationship
between culture and cognitive formation than previously
thought, there must be something like a "politics of
thinking." All culture contains a political relationship-
following Louis Althusser, culture is always ideological
since it expresses "the subject's imaginary relationship to
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the real," which is infused with historical relationships of
class, power, and domination. If there is a cultural
determination of cognition, then cognitive structure has
a political dimension, or at least a political confluence.
Commodification, the central process of capitalism, is
driven by capitalism's inherent need for accumulation.
Firms that fail to accumulate more capital for further
investment in the development of productive capacities
and for profit (that is, for shareholders) decline or are
driven out of business by competitors. The need for new
markets and productive resources (including labour)
drives capitalism around the globe, as Marx noted in the
nineteenth century, but it also drives capitalism to seek
these necessities within existing social space. Hence, in
the twentieth century, Frankfurt School critical theory
pioneered the social psychological analysis of mass culture
and mass entertainment as cultural commodification, the
imposition of the commodity form into people's hearts
and minds, so to speak, transforming their desires, hopes
and dreams outside the dull routine of the workplace
into those that express the needs ofcapitalism. For example,
the capitalist culture industry takes a young woman's love
of herself (her amour de 501) and sells it back to her as this
or that hair product, makeup, or smart piece of clothing. It
manufactures pre-digested and standardized entertainment
products, whose fabrication imitate the standardized
routines of work life. While "all needs should be presented
to individuals as capable of fulfilment by the culture
industry, they should be so set up in advance that indi-
viduals experience themselves through their needs only
as eternal consumers, as the culture industry's object ...
that they must make do with what is offered, whatever it
may be."48 As a result, the "dreamworlds" of mass culture
anaesthetize the consumer against the harm and robbery
that he or she suffers at the hands of capitalism,49 and
mass culture serves the ideological function of pacif)Ting
class conflict and aiding the social stability required for
continued accumulation. People unknowingly affirm
and support a system that impedes their interests as
autonomous beings and harms their potential development.
Capitalism harms with respect to cultural value because
it offers a vision of life and a form of development that
is extremely narrow compared to the possibilities that
human life possesses in principle-the only development
supported is that which is capable ofserving accumulation
goals and all else is irrelevant, relegated to the cultural
and political margins. 50 Capitalism harms human beings
through neglect rather than through terror.51 People's
quality of life and well-being are adversely affected by
such developments, the widespread experience of which
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has given rise not only to the new social movements of
the late twentieth century but to dangerous reactions of
ressentiment-expressions of ethnic hatred, racism, and
even identity politics can also be understood to bear the
weight of the sufferings of capitalist development. 52
The fundamental operations of accumulation and
commodification have not changed in late capitalism. If
anything, they have intensified and extended in this new
stage or phase of multinational, globalizing capitalism.
New information technologies have allowed a massive
speedup of financial transactions, greatly increased the
sensitivity of stock and production monitoring Uust-in-
time production) and the coordination with consumer
preferences via surveillance, and they have created new
phantasmagorias of virtual realities for consumption and
entertainment (for example, the Internet, software and
video games).53 In late capitalism, the economy has
become cultural and culture has become economic, as
Jameson argues. 54 Ideology has not at all ended in post-
modernity, as empirical studies continue to demon-
strate,55 and the analytic value of the concept continues
to be affirmed in the face of postmodern cynicism.56
Consumerism as an ideology, however, now appears
to operate differently than it did in its modern monopoly
capitalist phase, which was through much of the twentieth
century.The cognitive operation of ideology has changed
or is in the process of changing under postmodern and
post-human conditions, which is one of Jameson's and
my convictions. One needs to test this hypothesis of a
"politics of thinking" through assessments of the new
cognitive studies literature that are framed by a focus on
interpretive power and, more generally, the thesis con-
cerning the aesthetics of democracy. FollowingJameson's
analysis ofpostmodern media culture as "the consumption
of sheer commodification as a process,"57 one may argue
that such media culture is less a case of mobilizing desire
for the product (for example, the "commodity aesthetics"
of Fordism58) than of engaging with what may be
called the "interpretive power" of the consumer.59 The
consumption of commodification as a process draws the
consumer into the commodification process at the level
of his or her achievement of cognitive sense making-it
requires significant reflective interpretive activity. The
"ambiguity, obscurity, or hypersignified nature of post-
modern advertising in general" requires significant
"interpretive power generated by communicative
interaction."60 In the new literature on culture and
cognition, some attempts are made to recognize an
immanent political dimension to human cognition. Yet
Karen Cerulo's collection on the sociology of culture and
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cognition, while documenting many worthy connections,
contains very little on the political and no reference at all
to the perspective of cognitive mapping and critical
theory that I seek to advance61 N. Katherine Hayles
hints at the political when she discusses the new kinds of
cultural configurations made possible by the post-human
replacement of the dualism of presence/absence with
that of pattern/randomness62 New ways of thinking
about the relationship between human and machine
become possible with the correlated decline of the liberal
human subject. But Hayles is never explicit about a
political structure to post-human cognition. Recent
histories of social cognition, while mentioning ideological
analyses, have very little to say about the importance of
the political to cognitive structure. 63 Can the new
cognitive science deepen our understanding of how
consumers are being drawn into commodification
processes? My suspicion is that cognitive science can
help if further ways to connect its results with critical
theory can be developed.
Communicative processes are now significantly
bound up with the "immaterial labour" of the enter-
tainment-advertising industries and the symbolic
manipulation of video and computerization such that
new forms of subjectivity and mediation are being
generated by the communicative power of the virtual. 64
The "pressure toward dematerialization" found in the
new "virtual bodies"65 that correspond to material
changes in human bodies are directly associated with the
new information technologies. 66 Studies of the new
virtual technologies show that their visual media affect
the construction of reality by users. 67 If, as a result of the
need to recover or maintain a purchase on the "wet" or
"naked"68 material embodiment ofhuman life against its
virtual disappearance, there is an "affective turn"69
occurring in the human sciences, then the question of
the relationship of cognition to embodiment requires
political investigation (in my mind, most usefully
thought of as an aesthetics of democracy). I am hence
less concerned with the social construction of scientific
discourse about nature, the body, gender or the mind,
which is exemplary in the work ofDonna Haraway, Bruno
Latour, or Emily Martin, than with the philosophical
reconstruction of political structure within cognitive
processes that are understood as a moment of the social
totality. Adorno and Jameson argue for the need to
maintain a purchase on the social totality: Adorno
thought of totality negatively-against Hegel's "intellectual
forced march" of systemic logic70-in order to think
of the non-conceptual, non-identical bodily social
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reproduction of life that is the condition of conscious-
ness under capitalism and also to hold onto a dialectical
(political) resolution for this condition's social suffering.
Jameson confirms that the social totality cannot be
represented aesthetically under conditions of multina-
tional capitalism, but it can be thought of scientifically,
as he believes Ernest Mandel's analysis shows.71 The
concept of the totality nevertheless remains necessary to
any transformative, utopian cultural politics of the future
and can be in any case "cognitively mapped" or observed
in the allegories of cultural texts (such as in Jameson's
work).As Hardt and Weeks point out, when one observes
the impossibility of representation in any naive or
mimetic sense by using concepts such as totality, cognitive
mapping, or allegory, one highlights the process of
interpretation itself. 72 I wish to conclude with a brief
consideration of the dialectic of an aesthetics of democracy
in the public sphere-via an analysis of the cognitive and
bodily involvement of the consumer with the music
technology of the MP3 and iPod.
iPod culture and the public sphere
Launched in 2001 ,Apple's iPod is a mobile music listening
device with earphones that uses digitally-encoded MP3
file formats. Users of the iPod (and other less popular
MP3 players) are a common sight in the urban environ-
ment. Discussions of iPod culture have tended to take as
their point of departure the work of Michael Bull,73
which builds upon and develops Raymond Williams's
notion of "mobile privatization"74 in the history of the
Sony Walkman.75 Drawing on international interview
data, Bull argues that iPod users manage their experience
of the city and transit via the power of sound to direct
that experience. The iPod is used overwhelmingly while
travelling through the urban environment. The iPod user
attempts to exercise "autonomy over time and space
through the creation of a privatized auditory bubble"
that, following Adorno, generates a comforting warmth
of personal audio experience against the alienated chill
of the city. There is great flexibility in selecting the
desired music through the navigation wheel that accesses
an entire music collection easily and the organized
playlist function, which allows for significant advanced
planning.Along with the enormous storage capacity of the
iPod, these features significantly increase the autonomy and
fi'eedom of the user to manage his or her sonic experience
compared to previous mobile music technologies. At the
same time, users may "construct fantasies and maintain
feelings of security precisely by not interacting with
others or the environment"-the street is instead made
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to conform to the aesthetic desire of the user and
interactional possibilities are neglected or ignored.76
The specific fantasy of solidarity vvith others that music
listening affords is, according to Adorno, immanent to
the eh'Perience, "The compositional subject is no individual
thing, but a collective one. All music, however individual
it may be in stylistic terms, possesses an inalienable
collective substance: every sound says 'we."'77
Theoretically, however, Bull does not make any
connection between iPod use and the historical distinctive-
ness of the postmodern media culture out of which it
emerges. Jameson argues that there is a "spatialization of
music" in postmodernity in which musical objects are
not offered for "contemplation and gustation"; instead,
the context is wired up and the space made musical
around the consumer.78 The iPod technology expresses
this. Jameson, along with Harvey, directly link such
spatialization with the cultural logic of multinational
capitalism embodied in the technology and its use.
Certainly there is, as Bull points out, a "cognitive orien-
tation to space" in operation here, but is there not a
dialectic being played out rather than simply "potentially
ambiguous results" to this process?79 The bringing forth
of a contextual world in which the cognitive object is
made to make sense that I argued earlier is at the centre
of human cognition is actualized here through a unique
interaction between the listening technology, the
mobilization of consumer cognitive activity, and bodily-
aesthetic-enactment. Jonathan Sterne has pointed out
that a significant amount of data is deleted by the
encoder that creates MP3 compression in order to make
the MP3 so portable and transmittable. The algorithms
that achieve this are based on the psychoacoustic principle
that one may "lose most of the vibrations in a recorded
sound and still hear it as roughly the same sound as the
version with no data compression ... Psychoacoustically,
the MP3 is designed to throwaway sonic material that
listeners supposedly would not hear othenvise." It is not
only the ear, but the whole head and chest cavity that
can conduct vibration. Hence, Sterne argues that the
psychoacoustic body "shapes vibrations before they enter
the ear and become sound." Since the MP3 offers only a
fraction of the original sound, listeners' bodies are allowed
to do the rest of the work: "The MP3 plays its listener."80
For Bull, iPod users create "spaces of freedom for
themselves through the very use of technologies that tie
them into consumer culture."81 But following Sterne,
we can see that there is much more going on in terms of
cognitive and aesthetic pel{ormance.The increased freedom
and autonomy to shape one's emotive experience and
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the narrative of one's movement through the urban
landscape is paid for by iPod users with increased sonic
inferiority, the exploitation of users' cognitive and
bodily capacities to compensate for this increased sonic
inferiority, and the substitution of fantasized solidarity
with the collective undercurrent of musical experience
instead of communicative interaction with others.
Integration into late capitalism is achieved through
enhanced autonomy in the fantasized solidarity of a
musical bubble. Yet the freedom and autonomy is real so,
considering the possibilities for musical education extended
by iPod use, can such empowerment be sublimated into
the political? More research is required to assess the
effects of this privatized communicative freedom on the
capacities and resources for communicative freedom in the
public sphere.
To conclude, this theory of the aesthetics of
democracy must always be understood dialectically, for it
describes at once the domination of the citizen-consumer
in postmodernity and the sources of liberation folded
into this experience. It dramatizes a rather different
contradiction, however, than that of Adorno's Fordist
experience, in which the substitute is always consumed
instead of the authentic, as the perpetually broken promise
of the culture industry "that the diner must be satisfied
with reading the menu."82 Yet the truth content of
Adorno's analysis of the alternative to this may still retain
its importance even if his analysis of mass culture is today
superseded, namely, that what is suppressed by the
contradiction-even this new postmodern contradiction-
is precisely the "secret of aesthetic sublimation: to
present fulfilment in its brokenness."83 Art still retains
this possibility and vocation, the hope of aesthetic
negativity to inspire "non-aesthetic" social critique, but
it must somehow respond to the new cognitive contexts
being established by the new cOImnunications technologies
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